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This report presents the results of a replication, with 199 culturally-diverse 
subjects, of Thomas Schelling’s (1957) experiments on tacit coordination. Section 1 
introduces the concept of focal point equilibrium selection in tacit one-shot symmetric 
pure coordination games, as presented by Schelling in his classic article; it then traces 
its subsequent exploration through experimental research, shows how it has been 
explained, particularly in terms of culture, and relates that kind of explanation to the 
experimental and null hypotheses of the present study and its associated predictions. 
Section 2 describes the design of the intercultural tacit coordination experiment, and 
section 3 the results. Finally, section 4 presents a very preliminary discussion of the 
implications of the experiment’s results in terms of the cultural explanation of focal 
point equilibrium selection. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Coordination games are those in which the behavior that would lead the 
players to a jointly preferred outcome is not unequivocally determined by the formal 
structure of the game1. In pure coordination games, no jointly preferred outcome 
involves a conflict of interest among the players, but some outcomes may be Pareto-
superior to others. In symmetric pure coordination games all jointly preferred 
outcomes are equally preferred by all the players. The simplest complete 
                                                
1 By contrast, cooperation games are those in which the formal structure of the game 
undermines the choice of strategies that would lead the actors to a jointly preferred 
outcome. 
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representation of a one-shot symmetric pure coordination game in strategic form is 
the following: 
 
 
  Player Y 
  Strategy C Strategy D 
Strategy A 1 , 1 0 , 0 
Player X 
Strategy B 0 , 0 1 , 1 
 
 
Here, player X faces a choice between strategies A and B, player Y faces a 
choice between strategies C and D, and both have a common interest (a payoff of 1 
unit) in coordinating their choices on any of the two outcomes corresponding to the 
strategy combinations AC and BD. The problem for the players is that this game has 
no dominant strategies and that it has two strict Nash equilibria (corresponding to 
points XA,YC and XB,YD) and a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (corresponding to 
both players randomly choosing their strategy with probability 0.5). In a tacit one-
shot symmetric pure coordination game, the coordination problem for the players thus 
consists of selecting a behavioral strategy that leads all of them to the same outcome 
(irrespective of which particular outcome, as long as all coordinate on the same one) 
without there being any guidance provided by the formal structure of the game, and 
without the players being able to exchange relevant information between them to do 
so. Under conventional game-theoretic assumptions, rational actors would not be 
expected to perform better than chance in selecting the same equilibrium outcome in 
this kind of games2. 
 
However, Schelling (1957) reported a set of informal experiments which 
showed that human beings outperform chance in selecting the same equilibrium 
outcome in tacit one-shot pure coordination games. In a situation such as the one 
depicted above, which could for example be thought of as a game in which two 
players win a prize if both choose heads or tails at the same time without 
                                                
2 In the Harsanyi and Selten (1988) framework, the structure of this type of games 
does not provide sufficient criteria in order for payoff-dominant or risk-dominant 
equilibrium-selection procedures to be implemented. 
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communicating, game theory would predict a 50% chance of success. In one of a 
series of informal experiments, Schelling set out to test this prediction by asking 42 
people to choose between heads or tails, telling them that they would win the game if 
they managed to choose the same answer as another fictional player who was given 
the same instruction. He found that “36 persons concerted on heads… and only 6 
chose tails”, outperforming a random distribution of answers. Similar non-random 
performance was obtained in all other tests. 
 
Schelling’s interpretation was that,  
 
“People can often concert their intentions or expectations with others if 
each knows that the other is trying to do the same. Most situations – 
perhaps every situation for people who are practiced at this kind of 
game – provide some clue for coordinating behavior, some focal point 
for each person’s expectation of what the other expects him to expect 
to be expected to do… It is not being asserted that they will always 
find an obvious answer to the question; but the chances of their doing 
so are ever so much greater than the bare logic of abstract random 
probabilities would ever suggest.” (Schelling 1960: 57) 
 
This passage marks the appearance of the concept of focal point in game 
theory. A focal point equilibrium outcome (such as heads in the previous example) is 
one which is selected by the players by virtue of it having certain features, exogenous 
to the formal structure of the game, that allow for the convergence of the players’ 
behavioral expectations. In trying to explain focal point equilibrium selection, 
Schelling conjectured that 
 
“Finding the key, or rather finding a key – any key that is mutually 
recognized as the key becomes the key – may depend on imagination 
more than on logic; it may depend on analogy, precedent, accidental 
arrangement, symmetry, aesthetic or geometric configuration, casuistic 
reasoning, and who the parties are and what they know about each 
other.” (1960: 57) 
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Based on Schelling’s work, (Lewis 1969) introduced the notion of salience in 
order to explain focal point equilibrium selection. Salience is purported to explain and 
predict a tendency for a particular equilibrium outcome to be selected by the players 
because it “stands out from the rest by its uniqueness in some conspicuous respect” 
(35).  
 
Subsequent experimental research has confirmed Schelling’s findings3. Most 
notably, Mehta et al. (1994a) designed an experimental setting in which 178 subjects 
played a series of “matching games” of the sort devised by Schelling. In that setting, 
87% of the subjects managed to coordinate their choice on heads in the coin toss 
game, and similar non-random performance was achieved in all of the other matching 
tests that constituted the overall experiment. 
 
Apart from confirming Schelling’s main result, Mehta et al. set out to explore 
the mechanisms underlying focal point equilibrium selection by distinguishing 
between, and testing for, three possible types of salience. Primary salience is a 
property of strategies in which players, given their perception that the formal structure 
of the situation provides “no reason for choosing one way rather than another” (660), 
recognize labels (features of the players’ subjective descriptions of the strategies) that 
make those particular strategies their non-rational object of choice. Secondary 
salience corresponds to strategies which are rationally chosen by players who expect 
other players to use primary salience, and thus base their choices on their beliefs 
about “the frequency distribution of primary salience in the relevant population” 
(661). Finally, Schelling salience corresponds to strategies chosen by the players in 
virtue of their application of “a rule of selection which, if followed by both players, 
would tend to produce successful coordination” (661).  
 
To test if coordination was achieved through primary salience, on the one 
hand, or secondary or Schelling salience, on the other, Mehta et al. randomly treated 
the subjects in two different experimental conditions. In the first condition, the 
subjects were simply instructed to pick any answer for each game, while in the second 
condition the subjects were instructed to choose an answer with the intention of 
                                                
3 Comprehensive reviews of the literature on experimental coordination games can be 
found in Kagel and Roth (1995, Chapter 3) and Camerer (2003, Chapter 7). 
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coordinating with another player. Players who are just picking would manage to 
coordinate their responses beyond a random expectation, if they base their choices  on 
primary salience. Players who are explicitly instructed to try to coordinate with other 
players would outperform those who are just picking, if they base their choices on 
secondary or Schelling salience. The experiment’s results showed that players who 
were just picking outperformed chance, and those who were explicitly instructed to 
play so as to coordinate their responses with other players outperformed those who 
were just picking (672). Therefore, these results reveal the existence of primary 
salience and indicate that secondary salience and/or Schelling salience play a 
significant role in focal point equilibrium selection in tacit coordination games4. 
 
In their theoretical model, Mehta et al. relate the concept of primary salience 
to the culture and common experiences of the players: 
 
“Among people with common experiences and cultural backgrounds, 
we might expect some correlation between what has primary salience 
for one person and what has primary salience for another. Thus, 
merely as an unintended result of nonrational play, we might expect 
the extent of coordination to be greater than would occur if players 
chose their strategies at random.” (1994a: 660) 
 
According to this explanation, subjects who belong to the same culture, or 
who have been exposed to common experiences, would tend to perceive the same 
labels in the available strategies. They would therefore recognize some strategies as 
being particularly salient, given those labels, and, by choosing accordingly, would 
unintentionally appear to be coordinating up to some extent their behaviors.  
 
By the same token, subjects from different cultures would tend to perceive 
different labels as the salient features of the available strategies. Thus, a lesser 
frequency of unintentionally coordinated strategies would be expected within a 
population of culturally-diverse subjects who are selecting strategies according to 
primary salience. 
                                                
4 These results were further confirmed in Mehta et al. (1994b). 
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This implication is consistent with findings from experimental psychology 
according to which people from different cultures tend to perceive, and direct their 
attention to, different features of the same narratives or visual configurations, and 
therefore report different aspects of the same situations as more salient than others5. 
For example, Miller (1984) showed that, when subjects were asked to evaluate a 
narrative about some acquaintance’s social behavior, “at older ages [and thus 
purportedly through cultural learning], Americans made greater reference to general 
dispositions and less reference to contextual factors in explanation” than Indians. In 
another study, Masuda and Nisbett (2006) show that, when asked to report how 
slightly changed images differed from one another, “compared to Americans, East 
Asians were more sensitive to contextual changes than to focal object changes”, 
which seems to “suggest that there can be cultural variation in what may seem to be 
basic perceptual processes”. Masuda and Nisbett (2001), report an experiment in 
which Americans and Japanese subjects, after having been presented with the same 
set of animated underwater scenes were asked to describe what they had seen. “The 
results showed that the Japanese (a) made more statements about contextual 
information and relationships than Americans did and (b) recognized previously seen 
objects more accurately when they saw them in their original settings rather than in 
the novel settings, whereas this manipulation had relatively little effect on 
Americans.” 
 
If this cultural interpretation of primary salience is correct, then not only 
should the frequency of pseudo-coordinated strategies through primary salience be 
expected to be lower in culturally diverse contexts. The same should also be the case 
for the frequency of coordinated strategic choices achieved through the 
implementation of secondary salience equilibrium selection mechanisms in contexts 
of cultural diversity. This, because coordination based on secondary salience depends 
on the actors’ shared beliefs about the expected frequency distribution of responses 
which are based on primary salience within a given population (Bardsley et al. 2008). 
This kind of beliefs actors hold about the prevalence of certain strategies in 
coordination games within a population has been called cultural beliefs (Greif 1994, 
                                                
5 For an overview, see Nisbett (2003). 
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2006); i.e. beliefs that most actors in a given population share about each others’ 
beliefs, by virtue of all belonging, and having a common sense of belonging, to the 
same community6. Thus, secondary salience would provide for lower levels of 
coordination in an intercultural coordination game because the players don’t share the 
same cultural beliefs. 
 
Since the third mode of explanation of focal point coordination, Schelling 
salience, involves the rational application of a rule of equilibrium selection (Sugden 
1995), it can in some occasions coincide with secondary salience, which would 
correspond to the rule “choose the strategy that you believe to have more primary 
salience among the players”. In that case, the expected coordination in an intercultural 
game would be the same as that expected to be achieved by choosing strategies 
according to secondary salience. But if actors who play according to Schelling 
salience recognize a rule which, if followed by all, would yield better expected results 
than those expected to be achieved by acting according to secondary salience, they 
will follow that other rule. The reasoning process whereby actors form those rules of 
selection and decide to act upon them in pure coordination games, has been modeled  
in terms of common labeling procedures by Sugden (1995), who describes them as 
shared languages based on “common elements in the culture, experience or 
psychology of the players” (541). Thus, with Schelling salience too, less coordination 
should be expected in intercultural games. 
 
In sum, the three modes of explanation explored in the literature about focal 
point equilibrium selection, and particularly those in the experimental literature 
related to the concept of salience, resort to a shared culture as one possible cause of 
coordination. The implication is that less coordination should be achieved in 
coordination games played by culturally diverse subjects than in coordination games 
played by culturally homogeneous actors; this is the experimental hypothesis of the 
present study (the null hypothesis thus being that coordination does not significantly 
                                                
6 Cultural beliefs can be analyzed as conventions: mutually expected 
behavioral regularities that help solve recurrent tacit coordination problems within a 
given population, because (almost) everyone in that population expects each other to 
expect from each other conformity with that regularity (Lewis 1969: 58, 78). In this 
analysis, the precedent of a strategy having successfully solved coordination 
problems in the past is what bears its salience (36). 
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vary, when the same coordination game is played by culturally diverse subjects and 
when it is played by culturally homogeneous actors). 
 
2. Experimental design 
 
 The present study closely follows Schelling’s (1957) original design, except in 
three aspects. First, a larger sample of subjects was used (N=199); Schelling’s sample 
varied in number from question to question, being 42 the highest number of 
participants7.  
 
Second, the phrasing of Schelling’s original questions was slightly altered in 
order for them to make sense to an international pool of participants and in order to 
adapt them to the design restrictions of an online survey platform (see Table A in the 
Appendix). The largest modification of an original question had to be done to one of 
the most famous questions asked by Schelling to his subjects, which involved 
choosing a place to meet in New York City, and for which the focal point equilibrium 
had been Grand Central Station. In the present study, that question was altered so that 
it involved the subjects having to choose a capital city in which to meet in an 
imaginary trip around the world. Additionally, Schelling’s question number nine was 
excluded and replaced with the map game described in Schelling’s paper outside the 
list of numbered questions. This was done because Schelling’s question number nine 
refers to an election procedure of which the precise wording can be confusing for an 
international pool of participants. On the other hand, the map game is more straight 
forward and offers interesting data in terms of coordination through visual salience.  
 
Third, the participants were randomly assigned in two different experimental 
conditions, to test for variations in coordination between actors that were primed to 
imagine that the other participants in the game were culturally diverse, and actors 
who were not primed in such a way. In the non-culturally primed condition, the 
participants were just asked to try to coordinate their responses with anonymous 
playing partner who would be randomly matched with them by a computer. They 
were then presented with the set of questions, and finally they were asked to answer a 
                                                
7 Mehta et al. (1994 a, b) sample sizes were 178 and 120 respectively. 
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set of questions about their demographic information. In the culturally primed 
condition, the participants were told that their playing partner would be someone 
“from another culture”, the phrasing of the set of questions always referred to a 
playing partner from another culture and they were asked to respond the demographic 
questions – which included several culturally-related questions – before they started 
to play the came. Besides that, the name of the game – which appeared in every page 
of the online survey – was “coordination game” for one condition and “intercultural 
coordination game” for the other. 
 
 An informal pilot test was conducted to check if the questions made sense to 
an international sample of participants, if the wording of the introduction and the 
questions managed to involve the participants in a coordination game situation, and to 
check if the priming method used to treat the separate experimental conditions 
worked correctly. A convenience sample of participants was selected from a personal 
mailing list. Half of them were sent the culturally primed set of questions and half of 
them were sent the non-culturally primed set of questions. Their responses were 
analyzed and some of the participants were interviewed, in order to make adjustments 
to the online survey’s final design. From the pilot test’s results, some minor changes 
were incorporated to the wording of the questions and a greater emphasis was placed 
on words such as “game”, play” and “win” in the phrasing of the introduction to the 
games and of the questions, in order to increase the participant’s involvement with the 
spirit of the games8. 
 
 Two surveys were built – one for each condition – in an online survey 
platform9, and invitations to play the games were issued to 556 members of the TED 
Talks online community10. The TED Talks community gathers all registered members  
in the TED Talks website. The TED Talks are an annual event in which innovators 
and key figures from a wide variety of disciplines, professions and walks of life 
present their work. People register in the website in order to receive updates, 
participate in discussions and to participate in a collective project to translate the talks 
into languages other than English. Accordingly, it is presumable that these are people 
                                                
8 The results of the pilot test can be found in the following URL: http://bit.ly/1sCHqe 
9 URL: http://www.zoomerang.com 
10 URL: http://www.ted.com 
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who have an adequate understanding of the English language and who have an active 
interest in knowledge and ideas. Thus, participants from the TED community could 
be expected to respond to an invitation to participate in an academic study (without 
having any monetary incentive) and to understand the instructions and questions of 
the game. These invitations were sent individually by email to randomly selected 
registered members of the TED Talks webpage, taking into account the following 
criteria. First, roughly the same number of men and women were invited to 
participate in the coordination games. Second, invitations were sent to roughly the 
same number of people (~13) from 45 geographically dispersed and culturally varied 
countries. Only people who had displayed recent activity in the TED website were 
invited. The invitations referred to a “coordination game” or to an “intercultural 
coordination game” depending in what treatment condition the member they were 
sent to was assigned. The surveys were programmed such that they could only be 
taken once from any given computer terminal, to prevent multiple answers from a 
single individual. Finally, after completing the game’s questions the participants were 
directed to an outlet which was set up in a blogging platform, in order to inform them 
about the nature and results of the experiment11.  
 
Table B in the Appendix presents the demographic information reported by 
the participants. They represent 45 countries, of which the highest number of 
respondents from a single country (the U.S.) represent 8%. The subjects were asked 
to classify themselves in one of 10 different cultural clusters, which were defined, 
with some wording modifications, according to the cultural categories of the 
Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map of the World, from World Values Survey12. The 
highest participation came from persons who identified themselves with English-
speaking culture (24%), Central European (14%) and Latin American (12%), 
comprising among them 50% of the sample. East Asian, Middle Eastern and South 
European participants comprised 11%, 9% and 8% of the sample, and South Asian, 
East European, North European and African, 7%, 6%, 5% and 4% respectively. 
Respondents were 51% women and 49% men; most of them 72% between 20 and 39 
years old. 48% of the participants completed university education, and almost 32% 
hold a master’s degree; 13% have only studied up to high school and 8% have PhDs. 
                                                
11 URL: http://deliberationlab.blogspot.com/ 
12 URL: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 
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The sample of participants has a balanced distribution of job descriptions, ranging 
from student and unemployed, to independent and those who work for the private and 
public sectors; very few are retired. There is also a quite balanced distribution of 
religions in the sample, with pluralities of atheists (26%), Muslims (17%), agnostics 
(16%) and Catholics (14%); the rest of the sample (27%) corresponds to “other”, 
Protestant, Jewish, Hindu and Buddhist. 
 
3. Results 
 
 The following table shows the percentage of people who gave the most 
frequent answer for each question, compared to Schelling’s results and some of 
Mehta et al. (1994a) subjects’ answers to similar questions. 
 
Intercultural Coordination Levels compared with 
Schelling (1957) and Mehta et al. (1994a) 
 
Schelling  
(N~42) 
Mehta et al. 
(N~178) 
Intercultural 
(N~199) 
Q.1. COINS Heads, 86% Heads, 87% Heads, 69% 
Q.2. PICKANUM 7, 100 and 13, 90%  7, 100 and 13, 67% 
Q.3. GRID 
Upper left, 59%, 
and 93% in 
diagonal. 
 
Upper left, 18%, 
and 52% in 
diagonal. 
Q.4. CITY 
Absolute majority 
meet at Grand 
Central 
London 56% 
London and Paris, 
54% 
Q.5. TIME 
Virtually all at 12 
noon 
 12 noon, 30% 
Q.6. SAYANUM 1, 40% 1, 40% 
7, 16%; 2, 14%; 1, 
8% (= 38%) 
Q.7. MONEY 1 million, 29%  1 million, 26% 
Q.8. PILES A/B 50/50, 88%  50/50, 83% 
Q.9. MAP Bridge, 88%  Bridge, 25% 
 12 
 
 
Although most proportions of coordinated responses in the intercultural 
sample are smaller than those obtained in Schelling’s experiment (and the comparable 
results from Mehta et al.), they show significant levels of coordination above what 
would be expected by chance. CHI square tests were performed for each question to 
test for cultural differences in the particular focal points into which the participants 
coordinated. None of the tests reveals significant differences between cultures at the 
0,05% significance level. The results are presented in Table C of the Appendix. 
Coordination levels were also compared between treatments, and no significant 
statistical difference (CHI square, α = 0,05%) was observed between the culturally 
primed participant’s coordination levels and those of the non-culturally primed 
participants (see Table D in the Appendix). These results, although in most instances 
weaker and in some instances (GRID, TIME and MAP) much weaker than 
Schelling’s results (and comparable Mehta et al. results), still do not allow for the null 
hypothesis to be rejected. 
 
 Caution has to be taken when interpreting the bearing of these results upon the 
disconfirmation of the experimental hypothesis. Although this is the first study to 
investigate tacit coordination within a sample of extremely culturally diverse subjects, 
the method to which is had had to resort in order to comprise the largest possible 
diversity (online surveys applied to members of an online community), still presents 
serious limitations.  
 
First, there is no way in which an experimenter can clarify the questions and 
the spirit of the game to the participants, nor way in which they can be monitored in 
detail. Second, cultural diversity in this study was related, first to an effort to build a 
widely international sample of participants, and second to the participants self 
classification into broad categories. Apart from that, this method can be possibly 
hiding and distorting important details of the participants actual “working culture”, 
the fact that they all speak English and that they all belong to a like-minded 
community formed on the basis of their shared interests. In any case, and taking into 
account these limitations, the results indicate that – at least within the bounds of the 
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TED Talks website members community – coordination can still be achieved at 
significant levels among culturally diverse actors. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
 The hypothesis that less coordination should be expected to be achieved in 
coordination games played by culturally diverse subjects than in coordination games 
played by culturally homogeneous actors can not be confirmed by the results 
presented in this study. Even though less coordination was achieved in these games, 
as compared with Schelling’s results, the variation of results is not significant enough 
to reject the null hypothesis. Further, subjects that were primed to play with a partner 
from another culture did not do significantly better or worse that those who were not 
primed. Thus, within the context of this study, some doubt can be cast upon 
(exclusively) cultural explanations of focal point equilibrium selection. 
 
 Schelling’s own hints towards cultural explanations of salience and focal point 
equilibrium selection, subsequent cultural explanations such as the ones reviewed at 
the beginning of this report, and models of repeated coordination games that show 
how certain conventions and norms can emerge, evolve and be sustained within a 
population (e.g. Skyrms 1996 and Young 1998), seem to all have conditioned an 
understanding of the role of culture in strategic interaction that tends to point towards 
the idea that it is culture what causes coordination. The results of this study show that 
significant levels of coordination can emerge in extremely culturally diverse 
populations. It may well be that it is also important to consider that a universal human 
capacity for  coordination might be what causes culture to emerge in the first place. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A 
Schelling’s original questions Intercultural experiment questions 
1. Name “heads” or “tails.” If you and your 
partner name the same, you both win a 
prize. 
1. Name “heads” or “tails.” You win if you 
and your playing partner name the same. 
2. Circle one of the numbers listed in the 
line below. You win if you all succeed in 
circling the same number. 
2. Check one of the numbers listed below. 
You win if you and your partner succeed in 
checking the same number. 
7   100   13   261   99   555 
3. Put a check mark in one of the sixteen 
squares. You win if you all succeed in 
checking the same square. 
3. Choose one of the sixteen squares in the 
image displayed below. You win if you and 
your partner choose the same square. 
Please remember your choice and go to the 
next page to mark your answer. 
▢  ▢  ▢  ▢ 
▢  ▢  ▢  ▢ 
▢  ▢  ▢  ▢ 
▢  ▢  ▢  ▢      
4. You are to meet somebody in New York 
City. You have not been instructed where 
to meet; you have no prior understanding 
with the person on where to meet; and you 
cannot communicate with each other. You 
are simply told that you will have to guess 
where to meet and that he is being told the 
same thing and that you will just have to 
try to make your guesses coincide. 
4. You are traveling around the World and 
you agree to meet with your partner in a 
capital city. Before you can agree in which 
capital city you will meet, communication 
is lost. Both of you will have to guess where 
to meet and will have to try to make your 
guesses coincide. Which capital city do you 
go to? 
5. You were told the date but not the hour 
of the meeting in No. 4; the two of you 
must guess the exact minute of the day for 
meeting. At what time will you appear at 
the meeting place that you elected in No. 
4? 
5. You were told the date but not the hour 
of the meeting of the previous question. 
The two of you must guess the exact 
minute of the day for meeting. At what 
time will you appear at the meeting city 
that you elected? 
6. Write some positive number. If you all 
write the same number, you win. 
6. Write a positive number. You win, if 
both you and your partner write the same 
number. 
7. Name an amount of money. If you all 
name the same amount, you can have as 
much as you named. 
7. Name an amount of money. Imagine 
that if you both name the same amount, 
you can have as much as you named. 
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8. You are to divide $100 into two piles, 
labeled A and B. Your partner is to divide 
another $100 into two piles labeled A and 
B. If you allot the same amounts to A and 
B, respectively, that your partner does, 
each of you gets $100; if your amounts 
differ from his, neither of you gets 
anything. 
8 You have to divide $100 into two piles, 
labeled A and B. Your partner also has to 
divide $100 into two piles, labeled A and B. 
Imagine that if you put the same amounts 
in A and B that your partner does, each of 
you gets $100; if your amounts differ from 
his, neither of you gets anything. How 
much would you put in each pile? 
(9. Two people parachute unexpectedly 
into the area shown, each with a map and 
knowing the other has one, but neither 
knowing where the other has dropped or 
able to communicate directly. They must 
get together quickly to be  rescued. Can 
they study their maps and coordinate their 
behavior? Does the map suggest some 
particular meeting place so unambiguously 
that each will be confident that the other 
reads the same suggestion with confidence?) 
9 You and your partner parachute 
unexpectedly into the area shown below, 
each with this map and knowing that the 
other has the same map, but neither 
knowing where the other has dropped or 
able to communicate directly. You must get 
together quickly to be rescued. Name the 
location on the map where you would go. 
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Table B 
Demographics Reported by Participants 
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Table C 
CHI square Tests for Effects of Culture on Focal Point Selection 
Question CHI square Degrees of freedom Significance 
1. COIN 4.146 4 .387 
2. PICKANUM 2.123 4 .713 
3. GRID 4.166 4 .384 
4. CITY 3.580 4 .466 
5. TIME 9.573 4 .048 
6. SAYNUM 2.948 4 .567 
7. MONEY 3.979 4 .409 
8. PILES A/B 5.381 4 .250 
9. MAP 2.314 4 .678 
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Table D 
CHI Square Tests for Differences in Coordination Levels Between Treatments 
Question CHI square Degrees of freedom Significance 
1. COIN 0.006 1 .938 
2. PICKANUM 0.184 1 .668 
3. GRID 0.002 1 .963 
4. CITY 0.561 1 .454 
5. TIME 0.013 1 .908 
6. SAYNUM 2.614 1 .106 
7. MONEY 0.001 1 .970 
8. PILES A/B 0.852 1 .356 
9. MAP 3.483 1 .062 
 
 
